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Introduction
Poverty reduction remains one of the main challenges for Latin America at the end of the
20
th century. Most of the countries in the region are classified as middle income by
international standards, and yet they register poverty rates well above what would be
expected given their GDP per capita. The reason for this ‘excess poverty’ lies in the high
inequality in the distribution of resources. Income inequality has not declined during the
1990s in any of the countries in Latin America for which comparable data for more than
two points in time are available.
1 This, combined with the meager growth experienced by
most countries, is the reason why poverty has remained at such high levels in the region.
Traditionally, governments have addressed the poverty problem by implementing
poverty-alleviation programs through social safety nets that are intended to provide some
temporary relief for the poor. However, it is now well established that these programs at
best provide temporary support, but they do not attack the causes of poverty. Moreover,
the traditional approach has almost always neglected general equilibrium effects that can
change, sometimes in pernicious ways, the interactions among individual households and
social networks. Some Latin American countries have pioneered poverty programs that
include additional components of investment in human capital through education and
health.
  2 However, more often than not, such programs provide only short-term relief
because they have not been adequately institutionalized to become of longer-term range.
The implementation of these policies has been influenced by the economics literature on
poverty, which has emphasized that the main policy problem is  targeting resources
effectively to the poor.
3  Although this kind of policy response is adequate and very
necessary in periods of economic crisis and negative shocks, it entails a rather
reductionist approach to the problem because it often restricts policies to provide only
with temporary alleviation. Poverty, however, is most of the times and certainly in Latin
                                                       
1 See Székely and Hilgert (1999).
2 A recent example is the PROGRESA program in Mexico, which combines cash transfers with support for
keeping children in school and investing in health and nutrition.
3 See for instance the review in Székely (1998).4
America, a structural problem caused by the way the whole economic system operates.
Therefore, it might only be effectively tackled with policies that modify the economic
environment in ways that allow all individuals in society to take advantage of the
opportunities that are being generated.
4 To start thinking about such policies, it is
necessary to focus on the mechanisms that generate inequality and poverty and construct
an analytical framework that would allow the identification of the structural mechanisms
at play.
In order to explore alternative approaches to the analysis of poverty and inequality, the
Research Department at the Inter-American Development Bank launched a Research
Network project on “The Assets and Resources of the Poor in Latin America.” The
results of the project are explained in this introductory chapter and six country studies,
for Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru.
The main argument that underlies the project is that poverty in Latin America or at least
the ‘excess poverty’ given the level of income in the region, is a problem caused mainly
by high inequality. But, as we will document, income inequality in the region is, to a
large extent, a reflection of a very skewed distribution of income-earning assets, human
capital being the most important.
5 Therefore, to understand what causes income
inequality that we observe, we must first determine why the distribution of income
generating assets is so unequal.
If one takes an asset-based approach to poverty, the central question becomes: why are
some individuals are able to accumulate the most productive  assets, while others are
prevented from doing so? Is it that there are market imperfections, or is the pattern we
observe the reflection of rational decisions that take into account expected returns on a
given asset and alternative opportunities? If the evidence were to point to the existence of
                                                       
4 This argument is developed in detail in IDB (1998).
5 This is not to say that inequality in returns (to human capital and other assets) does not play an important
role. Indeed, the increase in inequality observed in the last 15 years is largely a reflection of changes in the
return to human capital and its variance. Here, however, we focus on the issue of inequality in the stocks
and its causes.5
market imperfections, then poverty reduction policies could be re-oriented to trying to
eliminate such restrictions.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to motivate the interest in our approach for
facing the poverty challenge, as well as to summarize the main findings in the six country
studies. The chapter is divided into 5 sections. Section 1 discusses in more detail our
framework for the analysis of poverty reduction. Section 2 documents the magnitude of
poverty in Latin America by presenting a series of estimates for 18 Latin American
countries with the most recent data available. Section 3 focuses on a crucial income-
earning asset (human capital) to illustrate our argument about the connection between
poverty, assets, and the restrictions to accumulate income-earning assets. Section 4
summarizes the results from the country studies. Finally, Section 5 is a conclusion.
1.  An Asset-Based Approach to the Analysis of Poverty: A Simple
Framework for Analysis
Poverty is normally measured using income as welfare indicator, mainly for two reasons.
The first is that income provides some indication about the capability of individuals to
achieve a certain standard of living. The second is that information on income is more
readily available than for other variables. In fact, among the possible options, income is
not necessarily the best alternative, but it has been widely used to measure poverty
mainly because of its availability.
6
Due to the widespread use of income as welfare indicator public policies aimed at
reducing poverty have concentrated on increasing such incomes through a variety of
instruments, or even “subsidizing” incomes directly through cash transfers. Some poverty
alleviation programs have included other mechanisms such as providing the poor directly
with a range of services under the idea that if the problem for the poor is lack of income,
the solution is to provide them with income or transfers in kind.
                                                       
6 For example, among the 111 works on poverty measurement in Latin America reviewed by Londoño and
Székely (1997), the vast majority of them use income as welfare indicator.6
Although this standard approach might be adequate in certain circumstances such as
periods of economic stagnation, natural disasters or unexpected negative income shocks,
it does not lead to a solution to the problem because it is focused on the “consequences”
of poverty rather than on its causes. The standard approach is better framed in terms of
the provision of insurance against some types of shocks, and as such it is subject to a
variety of problems, ranging from moral hazard to the crowding out of private insurance
schemes. Moreover, this type of schemes provide benefits for rather short periods of time,
but leave the poor in the same (or very similar) position when they are discontinued. On
the other hand, as we argue below, there are situations in which the provision of
insurance against certain types of shocks interacts in a virtuous way with the incentives to
accumulate human capital. It has been argued, for instance, that temporary income shocks
can induce poor households to withdraw children from school, therefore permanently
hampering the accumulation of human capital. The rest of this section sketches a simple
framework for analyzing the poverty problem from a wider perspective.
1.1 Going Beyond Income
 In general terms, income is a function of the combination of four crucial elements: (i) the
stock of income-earning assets owned by each individual; (ii) the rate at which these
assets are used for producing income; (iii) the market value of income-earning assets; and
(iv) transfers and bequests independent of the income-earning assets owned. Thus, family
per capita income –which is the welfare indicator traditionally used in Latin America to
classify the population into poor and non-poor-, can be expressed in general terms as:
n
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where y is the household per capita income of individual i. A is a variable representing
the stock of asset type a, owned by individual i. R is a variable representing the rate at
which asset type a is used by individual i. P is the market value per unit of asset type a. j7
represents the number of income-earners in the household to which individual i belongs, l
is the number of different types of assets, k is the number of individuals in the household
obtaining income from transfers or bequests, while n is the size of the household to which
i belongs.
Equation (1) should then be complemented with equations describing the accumulation of
each asset.  The process of accumulation, obviously, would be asset-specific. For
instance, in the case of human capital, it would depend on the rate of utilization of that
asset (if a child goes to work, she will not be able to go to school). Furthermore, it might
depend on the availability of other assets. For instance, the parent’s human capital or
access to ‘social capital’ in the form of credit or other help from the community might
facilitate the process of accumulation of the child’s human capital. Finally, it might
depend on the shocks households receive and how these may be alleviated by contingent
transfers T.  For instance, certain types of temporary shocks could induce very poor
households to withdraw their kids from school to provide additional income. Transfers
targeted at counteracting these types of shocks could be particularly useful. However,
publicly provided insurance could induce moral hazard and could also crowd out private
transfers and affect the interaction among households.
7
Traditional poverty alleviation programs have been aimed at Ti, in a way that is typically
independent from the individual’s capacity to obtain income (and on the possible effects
of such transfers on A, R or P). On the other hand, policies aimed at affecting A, R or P
will have much deeper and permanent effects on poverty because they address the long-
term income-earning capacity of individuals. Lets now define each of these elements in
more detail.
To simplify our framework and make the analysis tractable from an empirical point of
view, we classify A into three types of assets: human capital, physical capital, and social
capital. Under human capital we include the set of skills that are needed to produce a
good or service. The most widely used proxy for quantifying these skills are the years of
                                                       
7 See Attanasio and Rios-Rull (1999).8
formal education. Other types of skills acquired through training are more difficult to
measure, and information on labor market experience is also seldom available. Therefore
we limit our definition of human capital to years of schooling.
‘Physical’ capital refers to the monetary value of any form of financial asset, money
holdings, property, and capital stock used for production. This type of capital can lay
different roles, in that it can be used to buffer temporary shocks, for the production of
income and can be accumulated for long-term objectives such as financing consumption
after retirement.
Regarding to social capital, we adopt a conventional definition by Putnam (1993) which
refers to the set of norms and social networks that facilitate collective action among
individuals. Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of
relations between persons and among persons, so it is the most difficult to quantify.
  8
Moreover, this type of capital is different from the others, as its accumulation does not
depend directly on individual decisions.
The ownership of or the access to any of these assets implies that an individual has the
potential capacity to generate income at some point in time, but the income that is
actually generated depends on the use of the asset. For instance, in the case of human
capital, the years of schooling of an individual will only be translated into income if there
is labor market participation (that is, R>0 in equation 1). Physical capital becomes an
income when the dividend or return generated by the stock is made liquid, while social
capital has a positive effect on yi when social relations are used to actually generate
income.
On the other hand, the market price of each income-earning asset (P in equation 1) is
rather independent from each individual because supply, demand and institutional factors,
                                                       
8 Coleman (1990). Among the three assets defined here, social capital is by far the most controversial in
terms of definition. Following the case study for Bolivia included in this project, the definition is derived
from Putnam (1993): “Social capital refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms and
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”9
in which the relative weight of each individual is negligible, determine it. Prices are
therefore set by the economic system, and they become relevant to the individual in the
process of deciding whether to obtain an income and whether to accumulate a certain
type of capital.
9 However, in the design of policies that might have large effects in the
accumulation of certain types of capital, the general equilibrium on its return should also
be kept into account.
Ti, according to our definition, refers to the market value of public and private transfers
and bequests.
1.2 Scope for Policy Action
As already mentioned, most poverty alleviation policies are aimed at the Ti component of
equation (1). But interventions through Ti may have an effect on incomes that is not
totally independent of A and R, for several reasons. First, government transfers that target
the poor may take A into account for defining its population of beneficiaries. Second,
certain types of policies may result in increases in A when they are directly aimed at
enhancing human capital or providing credit for production. Additionally, they may
provide incentives for affecting R by requiring that individuals use the income-earning
assets they own for receiving a benefit. But  T  can also have negative effects, either
directly, by altering the incentive structure faced by individual households, or indirectly,
through general equilibrium effects. If the transfer program is large enough, general
equilibrium effects can also affect the prices and returns of various programs.
10
Unfortunately, these last considerations are often ignored in the design of actual transfer
programs. And even when the potentially beneficial effects of these policies on A and R
constitute the stated aim of the program, if the program itself is temporary in nature it
would not be suitable to have an impact on long run decisions. As a consequence these
programs rarely result in a substantial improvement in the long-term income-earning
                                                       
9 Birdsall, Pickney and Sabot (1999) develop a model in line with this argument, where they sort out the
interaction between returns to labor, the incentives to the use of human capital, and income distribution.10
capacity of individuals. That is, they are not able to eliminate the restrictions that prevent
the poor from accumulating A.
A good example is the case of poverty alleviation policies that have a human capital
component through the provision of income transfers through scholarships. The logic
under which most of these programs operate is that children in poor families are not able
to accumulate human capital because the family faces an income constraint that prevents
them from financing the monetary costs associated with sending children to school. Costs
range from transportation and materials to the income forgone by the family because the
child does not participate in the labor market. So, if the family is provided with an
income subsidy in monetary terms or in kind, it will be able to finance these costs and
keep the child in school.
The above approach would be a sufficient solution if the transfer of resources was
permanent, if the family could rely on it with certainty through the child’s full process of
human capital accumulation, and if low income was the only restriction that households
face. But in practice, such programs are neither permanent nor fully reliable in the long-
run, and most importantly, they usually do not address the main constraints that prevent
an (efficient) accumulation of human capital. These may include the absence of efficient
credit or insurance markets that allow individuals to diversify idiosyncratic risk and force
the household to adopt relatively unproductive investment strategies.
11 It is therefore
crucial, when designing a transfer scheme targeted at a particular goal, for instance that of
                                                                                                                                                                    
10 For instance, Heckman et al. (1998) consider a dynamic general equilibrium model in which optimal
human capital accumulation decisions are affected by factor prices and in turn, aggregate supply effects
affect factor prices. Cameron and Heckman (1998) estimate a model of schooling decisions for US males.
11 This argument has been made several times in development economics in relation to the diversification
of rural investment. It has been argued that in many under-developed countries rural households adopt
relatively inefficient crops because of the non-availability of insurance mechanisms. A similar argument
may hold for the investment in human capital, even though it is a long run investment.
Another common restriction that interacts with liquidity constraints and risk is the indivisibility of
investment. For instance, Galor and Zeira (1993) argue that some investments (including human capital)
require a minimum amount of resources to make the investment worthwhile. If such resources are
unavailable and individuals face credit constraints they might rationally choose not to make the investment
at all and use the available resources for less productive ventures.11
improving school enrollment of a certain age group, to understand the main structural
reasons such a goal is not achieved by the households in the first place.
Another example is credit programs for the poor. One can readily imagine situations in
which the provision of credit through a poverty alleviation program would lead to an
increase in consumption rather than productive investment, which was the original target.
This would occur, for instance, if, in addition to the non-availability of credit, the poor
are subject to an income constraint (because their incomes are lower than the necessary to
satisfy the family’s basic needs) and to severe and uninsurable uncertainty.  Individuals
close to survival have a very high marginal utility of current consumption, while the
return on potentially productive investments can be very uncertain. The program could be
effective if it addressed the main reason for the lack of insurance markets and credit, for
instance the presence of asymmetric information and induced moral hazard.
12
These examples should make clear the usefulness of framing the problem of intervention
for poverty reduction in terms of equation (1). Within this framework, one may think of
several ways in which policy action could increase the incomes of the poor. First, policies
may be aimed at increasing Ti, through some type of income transfer. As stressed above,
these solutions are unlikely to be beneficial in the long run. Moreover, one should
consider carefully the effects (beneficial or otherwise) that they might have on the other
variables in the equation.  Second, policies could be aimed at generating a price structure
that produces higher rewards for the assets typically owned by the poor. This is obviously
a very unrealistic target, especially if one operates in an open economy. Third, policies
may provide incentives for modifying the rate at which the existing assets are used for
generating income. Again, the design of these  type of policies requires a complete
understanding of the incentives and mechanisms at play in the process of asset
accumulation and utilization. Fourth, they may be focused at increasing the capital stock.
Fifth, if the restrictions that the poor face for accumulating income-earning assets were
identified, policies could be aimed at eliminating or easing the constraints.12
The main issue we want to stress is that any of the first four alternatives will only be able
to improve the standard of living of the poor to a limited extent if the restrictions to
accumulate remain unaltered. If the restrictions remain unchanged, any action through the
first four options will in some sense imply “swimming against the tide” because the
economic context will continue to be imposing restrictions for enhancing the long-term
income-earning capacity of the poor. On the other hand, if policies focused on
eliminating the restrictions faced by the poor for accumulating assets, they would have a
more permanent effect, and in fact, any of the other four options considered above would
perhaps be redundant. This strategy, however, imposes the greatest challenge because it
implies affecting elements of the whole economic system. But precisely because of its
broad effects, it is the only real option for tackling the causes of poverty and providing
some solutions to the problem.
The ultimate objective of each of the six country studies included in this project is to
provide with empirical evidence on the link between assets and poverty, and whenever
possible, to identify the restrictions faced by the poor for accumulating income-earning
assets. Rather than exhausting this topic, our aim is to take some steps to showing its
potential as an alternative policy approach to poverty reduction and poverty analysis.
13
Before illustrating empirically the argument discussed above, it is necessary to clarify
what is the magnitude of poverty in Latin America. The following section addresses this
issue.
2.  The Magnitude of the Problem: Poverty in Latin America in the
1990s
In this section we use household survey data from 18 Latin American and Caribbean
(LAC) countries for the years around 1996 to document the extent of poverty in the
                                                                                                                                                                    
12 This is the idea behind, for instance, the popular Grammeen banks that have recently been studied in the
literature.
13 For the link between asset distribution and other development indicators such as the rate of economic
growth, see Birdsall and Londoño (1997).13
region. After presenting these estimates, we make explicit the connection between
poverty, inequality, and assets through a simple decomposition.
The 18 countries included in the analysis of this Section and Section 3 cover around 93%
of the total population of the region, and in all cases, with the exceptions of Argentina
and Uruguay, the data is representative at the national level. In Argentina and Uruguay,
the household surveys have urban coverage only, but they still include around 85% and
more than 91% of the population in each case. As for the timing of the surveys, one (for
Nicaragua) refers to 1993, four to 1995 (Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Uruguay),
seven to 1996 (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and
Mexico), five to 1997 (Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela) and one to
1998 (Honduras). Table A1 in the Appendix provides more information on each of the
surveys used.
14
2.1 Poverty in Latin America during the Second Half of the 1990s
To the best of our knowledge, the estimates we present here are the first covering all 18
countries and going beyond 1995. To produce our estimates we follow the methodology
by  Londoño and Székely (1997) (henceforth LS), which is adequate for international
comparisons.
15 The method consists in scaling up household per capita incomes in the
surveys to match PPP adjusted private consumption per capita from the National
Accounts,
16 and using a poverty line of two PPP adjusted dollars-per-day per person to
                                                       
14 Some of these surveys where obtained through MECOVI, a program sponsored by the World Bank, the
IDB, and CEPAL to collect and organize the existing household surveys in Latin America and to promote
the implementation of new ones. The rest of the surveys where obtained directly through country statistical
offices.
15 Londoño and Székely (1997), who documented changes in poverty and inequality in LAC for 1970-1995,
considered information for 13 countries, covering around 83% of the population in the region. Apart from
having a wider coverage of the region’s population, there are other differences between our study and LS.
The first is that we include 7 additional countries; the second is that we do not include information on The
Bahamas and Guatemala (which are included in LS), and third, we use more recent household survey data
for the countries that are included in both studies.
16 This adjustment is performed for two reasons. The first is that we want the incomes of all countries to be
in the same units to be able to apply the same poverty line. Second, and most importantly, there are
differences between surveys as for the degree of under-reporting of incomes. Private consumption in the
National Accounts is a good proxy of the resources available to households for purchasing goods and
services, so by scaling incomes up to this aggregate we may obtain a more comparable series across
countries, than if we use the raw data. This methodology implicitly assumes that the under-reporting is
proportional to current income and that the factor of proportionality is the same across the income14
classify the population into poor and non-poor. It must be stressed that calculating
poverty in this way normally yields estimates below calculations made with local poverty
lines.
17 The value of the poverty indexes obtained is more useful for ranking countries in
international comparisons rather than for obtaining the best poverty estimate for each
individual country. It should also be mentioned that since we have access to the micro
data in all 18 countries, the estimates have a high degree of comparability. However, due
to differences in survey characteristics, samples, questionnaires, etc., full comparability
across countries is not guaranteed.
Figure 1 presents the results, and shows that there is a wide variety among the LAC
countries. Poverty rates go from more than 70% in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Bolivia,
to less than 20% in Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. Argentina and Uruguay have some
of the lowest proportions of poor, but it should be remembered that these two countries
do not include observations for rural areas, so there is an underestimation of poverty as
compared with national samples. Paraguay and Honduras are also among the poorest
countries, with more than 60% of the total population below the PPP adjusted 2-dollars-a-
day poverty line. After Honduras, there is a group of 3 countries (Brazil, Panama, and
Ecuador), all with poverty rates between 40% and 50%. Some of the countries included
in this group, especially Brazil and Panama, are countries with GDP per capita above the
LAC average, which in international comparisons are classified as belonging to the group
of middle-income countries. Therefore, it is rather surprising that they have such high
poverty rates. A similar argument applies to Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica,
which have poverty rates between 22% and 30%. These rates are high considering that
these upper-middle-income countries have some of the highest GDP per capita in the
region. The reason for the mismatch between poverty and average income is that all these
countries have very high inequality levels. Following these countries, a group comprised
                                                                                                                                                                    
distribution. If rich households under-report a larger fraction of their income, the method will
underestimate poverty.
17 Since PPP private consumption per capita for 1996 and 1997 was only available in a preliminary form for
LAC, the poverty estimates for the countries with household surveys for these years or 1998 should be
taken as preliminary. They are subject to change if the aggregates in the National Accounts are modified
with more recent data.15
of Uruguay, Venezuela, Chile, and Argentina has rates between 15.8% and 20%, which
are still rather high for their GDP per capita.
With regards to the LAC region as a whole, the average poverty rate is 40%. In terms of
absolute numbers of poor, our estimates show  that around 1996, 180 million Latin
Americans lived under the 2-dollars-a-day poverty line.
18 Thus, the magnitude of this
problem in the region is still considerable. This is why poverty reduction remains one of
the greatest challenges.
2.2 Poverty, Inequality and Income-Earning Assets
One simple way of making the link between poverty, inequality, and assets explicit is to
perform the decomposition of poverty indexes suggested by Székely (1998, chpt. 4). This
decomposition allows splitting poverty into three components when the population is
divided into subgroups according to certain criteria: an “income” component, a “between-
group” inequality element, and a “within-group” inequality term. Following this
methodology, after classifying the population into subgroups according to a characteristic
of the population for which household surveys provide information, poverty indexes from
the family of  additively decomposable indexes (such as the head count ratio used in
Figure 1) can be expressed as:
m S S S S W B + + =     (2)
where S is a decomposable poverty index, SB is the between-group component, SW is the
within group term and  Sm is the income component. Sm/S measures the proportion of
poverty due to lack of resources to satisfy each individual’s basic needs. It is the poverty
that would remain even if income were perfectly distributed among the population. If
average income is greater than the poverty line, the value of this component equals zero.
                                                       
18 Note that the absolute number of poor obtained by following the LS method is a point estimate specific
to this methodology. Székely, et.al. (1999) for instance show that with the application of other methods for
computing poverty, the number of poor in LAC can range between 50 and 280 million individuals. We
follow the LS method for our results because we consider that this is the best option for international16
SW/S is the proportion of poverty associated with the inequality within each subgroup, and
is regarded as the proportion of poverty “not explained” by the characteristic chosen to
classify the population. It is the poverty that would remain if mean income were above
the poverty line, and there were no differences among the average incomes of the
subgroups. Finally,  SB simulates the poverty that would remain if there were no
differences within groups and average income was above the poverty line. The statistic
SB/S is the proportion of poverty associated with between group inequalities, and can be
regarded as the proportion of poverty “explained” by the characteristic chosen to classify
the population into subgroups. If there are no differences between-groups, this statistic
equals zero. SB/S+ SW/S is therefore the proportion of poverty due to inequality.
All the countries in Figure 1 have average private consumption per capita (which we have
used as welfare indicator to measure poverty) above the two-dollars-a-day poverty line.
Therefore, Sm/S=0, which implies that poverty in Latin America is not a matter of lack of
resources. If income was perfectly equally distributed among the population there would
actually be no poverty.
19 Poverty is therefore accounted for by the inequality in the
distribution of resources.
Table 1 presents the value of the  SB/S statistic obtained by dividing the population
according to a range of population characteristics. As mentioned above, this statistic
informs on how much poverty is associated to the inequality between-groups. The
poverty not accounted for by this statistic, is therefore attributable to within-group
differences. For most of the 18 surveys available, there is information on every
individual’s sector of activity, occupation, age, sex, education level, and rural/urban
location. We use each of these characteristics to classify the population into subgroups by
taking the characteristics of the household head as reference, and perform the
decomposition in equation (2) using the same methodology as in Figure 1 to estimate
poverty.
                                                                                                                                                                    
comparisons. In any case, the conclusion that poverty is extremely high by international standards in Latin
America holds with any of the methodological options considered in  Székely, et.al. (1999).17
With respect to the age of the household head, life-cycle theories suggest that the income
profile of individuals is hump-shaped. Thus, households headed by relatively old
individuals would normally be poorer because earnings decline with age due to
productivity reductions and also because pensions and transfers for retirement tend to be
of low value. Similarly, households headed by relatively young individuals also are
expected to earn low incomes because of low labor market experience and relatively
large family size. Therefore, in relatively young or aging economies, we would normally
expect that poverty would be associated with age differences, while in countries in the
middle-stages of the demographic transition these disparities would be less important.
Table 1 shows that on average 2% of the total poverty in the region can in fact be
attributed to age differences, which is quite low. In line with the theoretical argument, the
countries that are most advanced (Argentina and Uruguay) and at the initial stages of the
demographic transition (Honduras and Paraguay) have relatively higher SB/S statistics for
this characteristic. Age differences are apparently not an important source of poverty in
LAC because most of the countries in the region are entering the middle-stages of the
transition where most of the population is of working age.
It is usually believed that poverty is also strongly associated with gender differences. This
is because there is a growing proportion of households headed by single females. Women
generally get paid lower remuneration for performing the same tasks than men due to
discrimination, and also because households tend to invest less in women, hindering their
income-earning capacity. However, the results in Table 1 indicate that only a very small
fraction of total poverty in the region is associated with gender differences (on average
the proportion is .5%). Rather than providing conclusive evidence against the argument
that female heads of household are disadvantaged, the result reflects that the number of
female-headed households is still small in the region. These households are typically
underrepresented in household surveys because the head is self-reported and also because
they are in fact highly vulnerable and tend to merge into other households forming
extended units. Only the female-headed households headed by relatively educated
                                                                                                                                                                    
19 Note that the decomposition relies on a static simulation that does not account for the possibility that if
income were perfectly distributed, perhaps average income would be lower or higher.18
women at the upper spectrum of the distribution actually survive as such, and appear in
the data as independent units.
One of the most common explanations for poverty in developing countries is the presence
of an urban bias through an unfavorable allocation of public goods and the presence
adverse terms of trade. According to the evidence in Table 1, rural/urban differences
account on average for around 12.2% of the poverty in the region, but they are associated
with around 30% and 20% in Mexico and Peru, respectively. Thus, particularly in these
countries the geographic location among urban and rural areas is an important
determinant of poverty, but according to the evidence it is not the major factor.
Another common argument is that poverty is determined by the sector of activity in
which the poor are enrolled, and thus by the structure of the economy. The poor tend to
have access to sectors with lower productivity, and as argued in Section 1, they may also
choose less profitable but also less risky activities in certain sectors. According to our
results, on average, 11.3% of the total poverty in the region is actually accounted for by
differences between sectors. As compared with rural/urban differences, the disparities
between sectors are less important.
Occupational disparities are also usually regarded as being important determinants of
poverty because the income-earning possibilities of individuals are strongly related to the
ownership of human and physical capital assets, which determine the chances of
overcoming the barriers of entry to certain occupations. Occupational indicators provide
some information on the access to human, physical and social capital, which are required
to be able to perform certain activities. Among the characteristics for which we have
information, the occupation is actually the second most important in terms of poverty.
Table 1 shows that 21.5% of the poverty in the region is associated with differences
across occupational groups. However, there are cases such as Mexico and Chile, where
these inequalities account for more than 40% of total poverty. Due to the connection
between asset ownership and occupation, the result is suggestive of the link between the
distribution of assets and poverty.19
With regards to educational differences, as we document later in Section 3 of this chapter,
poor individuals are rarely able to finance the private costs of schooling even when there
is public free access to these services. In countries where formal education and skills are
concentrated, unskilled labor is relatively more abundant and poorly paid, while skilled
labor is scarce and highly rewarded. The price structure reflects the interaction between
an unequal distribution of these assets and the demand for skills. Table 1 confirms that
quite a significant proportion of poverty in Latin America is associated precisely to
income differences across education groups. On average, 28.6% of the total poverty
would be eliminated if there were no disparities between education groups. In Mexico,
Honduras, Costa Rica, Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina, more than one third of the overall
poverty rate is accounted for by educational differences. Thus, having more or less skills
is a stronger determinant of poverty than being located in rural areas, being employed in
relatively unproductive sectors of activity, belonging to female-headed households, or
living in households with relatively young or old heads. The results illustrate that there is
a powerful link between poverty and the distribution of human capital.
3.  Poverty and Assets
The results in Section 2 indicate that the ‘excess poverty’ present in many countries in
LAC (given their average per capita income) is to be explained by the high level of
inequality. This is in turn likely to be linked to high levels of inequality in income
generating assets, and in particular human capital. In this section, we take a closer look at
the number of years of formal schooling, that is one of the main components of human
capital, and is probably the most important income earning asset. Specifically, within the
context of equation (1) we examine the distribution of the stock, its use by different
sectors of the population, and the prices paid for it in the market. Second, and most
importantly, we illustrate our argument about the connection between poverty and the
restrictions to accumulate assets by examining the process of human capital accumulation
and providing some evidence on what are the constraints that the poor face for its20
acquisition. Among the three income-earning assets considered by this project, we choose
human capital because it is the asset for which high quality information is available to us.
3.1 Human Capital in Latin America: Its Distribution, Use, and
Remuneration
It is not surprising that the poor typically have low schooling levels. Using the same
household survey data as in Section 2 we document this fact for the 18 Latin American
countries in our sample. Figure 2 presents the results, by ordering countries according to
their GDP per capita level.
20 The Figure includes the average years of schooling of all
adults between 25 and 65 years of age in three different quintiles. Clearly, adults at the
lower end of the income distribution have acquired much less human capital than
individuals in the same age-range in the upper quintiles.
On average, adults in the first quintile have 4.4 years of schooling. Those in the middle
quintile have 6.6, while those located in the richest quintile have 10.5. The average
difference between the poorest and richest 20% is 6.1 years, but there is a wide variety
across countries. While in Venezuela the difference is of around 4 years, in Brazil,
Colombia, El Salvador, Panama, Mexico, and Bolivia, the gap is of more than 7. Since
education is one of the main determinants of income, it is clear that the income-earning
capacity in terms of human capital is very poorly distributed in LAC. Even the
differences between the poorest 20% and the third quintile are quite high (they range
from 1.6 years in Uruguay to 3.4 in Peru). So, in terms of equation (1) the Figure
provides evidence on the highly skewed distribution of one of the elements in A.
If we focus only on males we find that human capital is very unequally distributed, but
there is no evidence that there are differences in the rate at which this asset is used to
produce income. In fact, labor force participation rates for all countries and education
groups are very close to 90%.
21 However, if we turn to the case of females there is a
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21 The results are not shown here for brevity, but are available upon request.21
totally different story. Figure 3 presents the female labor force participation rates for the
25-65-age range. The data clearly show that there are very large differences across
education groups. On average, the participation rate for females with incomplete primary
schooling is 39%, while the rate for those with secondary and higher education is 61.8%
and 77.4% respectively. The differences in participation rates between the highest and
lowest education levels seem to increase with GDP per capita and are greatest in Chile,
Panama, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia, where there is a gap of more
than 45 percentage points.
Thus, in the case of females, a low level of human capital is clearly associated with a low
rate of use. In terms of equation (1), this illustrates that A and R can be closely linked. It
is important to stress that this evidence does not imply that women belonging to poorer
sectors of the population work less. The information only means that a much smaller
proportion of women with low education, and that typically belong to the lower spectrum
of the distribution, receive a remuneration for their labor in the market. In fact, women
with few years of education may devote more hours to work, but few of those hours
relate to work for which retribution in monetary terms is received.
The  comparison becomes even more dramatic when comparing female labor force
participation in the formal sector. Figure 4 reveals that the differences across education
groups are even greater in this case. The average formal participation rate among females
with incomplete primary education is 5.6%, while the average among the highly educated
is 52%. So, the differences in use arise not only because females with lower income-
earning capacity use their human capital at a lower rate, but also because those that
participate in the labor market do so in jobs that typically have lower stability, less
benefits, and lower quality.
Obviously the link between the distribution of schooling and labor force participation is
the return to the use of human capital. Females with low education levels choose not to
participate in the labor market because the incentives to participate in the market sector
rather than home production might not be enough. However, for females with higher22
education levels, the rewards that the market offers are attractive enough to induce a
higher proportion of them to use this asset.
Table 2 provides some evidence on the returns to education in the 18 Latin American
countries under analysis (this is the P component of equation (1)). The table shows the
coefficients of a standard OLS Mincer regression where the dependent variable is the log
hourly wage of each individual, while the independent variables are experience (proxied
by age minus six minus years of schooling), experience squared, and a vector of dummies
representing 5 different education levels.
22 As compared with the distribution of
education and labor force participation, the returns to education are determined by a
variety of factors, and are less subject to individual preferences and decisions.
Not surprisingly, Table 2 shows that the returns to education increase considerably by
level. This suggests that the poor not only have low incomes because of their few years of
education, but also because the schooling they have receives a lower reward in the
market. The rich have more years of schooling and they receive a larger income not only
for having greater stocks of human capital but because they own the types of education
that are valued most.
According to the information in Table 2, on average, for the 18 countries, having
incomplete primary schooling implies an income 18% higher than having no schooling.
Complete Primary education yields a return of 37%, while incomplete and complete
secondary education have a return of 61% and 95%, respectively. The greatest returns are
observed for higher education, with 1.52% on average. The largest differences in returns
between the lowest and highest schooling levels are observed in Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico.
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selection biases due to participation. However, the conclusions about the changes in the returns to
education and the differences between low and high schooling levels do not change substantially when
corrections to the bias are attempted.23
This evidence illustrates the circularity between asset ownership, use, and return. The
poor have the smallest stocks of human capital. They receive the lowest rewards not only
for having a small stock but also because the returns are non-linear and increase with the
size of the stock. Finally, due to the low returns, the poor (and specifically women) end
up using the asset at a lower rate.
Interestingly, this circularity is reinforced when individuals join together into families.
Table 3 provides some evidence on this. The Table plots the correlation between the
years of education of the household head (which is typically male) and its spouse, for 17
countries. As can be seen, the correlation is positive and high. It ranges from .39 in the
case of Venezuela, to .96 in Argentina. Thus, individuals with low human capital tend to
form households with others with similar levels, and vice versa. The second column in
the table presents the correlation between the income earned by the head of the household
and his (her) spouse. This correlation not only accounts for assortative mating in terms of
education, but also incorporates the effect of participation. In all cases, the correlation is
positive and quite high, indicating that individuals with low income-earning potential
tend to form households with individuals that have similarly low income-earning
capacity. This translates into low family incomes, and perhaps more importantly, into
restricted capacity to finance the accumulation of human capital for younger generations.
For the  well-educated, the correlation reinforces a  virtuous circle between asset
ownership and family formation.
Table 2 includes estimates of the returns to education for several years for the countries
for which more than one comparable household survey for the 1990s is available to us.
With very few exceptions the  returns to all education levels have been increasing.
Moreover, returns have increased more for the highest levels. It should be noted,
however, that these shifts are in line with a worldwide trend and are not exclusive of the
LAC region. Where Latin America and the Caribbean stand out is in the large differences
in return between low and high schooling levels.24
Obviously the simple description of the data reported here does not constitute the whole
story. Research should be developed in several directions that are beyond the scope of
this chapter. First, the returns to education should be corrected for selection biases in
several dimensions. Second, and related to this, there might be important differences
between observed wages and the price of different skills (Heckman, Lochner and Taber
(1997) have recently stressed this argument). Finally, in considering the incentives to
invest in human capital, one should also consider the general equilibrium effects that
large changes in the supply of some skills might have on their prices.  While all these
issues are extremely important, the evidence we present is sufficient to illustrate that
inequality in the stock of human capital and its use are, at least given the current returns
to education, crucial in explaining inequality in Latin America.
3.2 Why Do the Poor Accumulate Less Human Capital than the Rich?
Following the argument of Sections 2.2 and 3.1 above, the key question regarding
poverty in terms of equation (1) is what are the restrictions that the poor face for not
being able to accumulate human capital. To turn to this question it is first useful to take a
closer look at the process of human capital accumulation.
Figure 5 plots the difference in average years of schooling between children in the
highest and lowest quintiles, for 4 different age groups (12, 15, 18 and 21 years of age).
For instance in the case of Uruguay, it can be seen that there is no difference between
children of age 12 at the top and bottom 20% of the income distribution. The average gap
at this age in the 18 countries is 1 year. The largest difference (of 1.6 years) is observed
in Brazil. But as we look at higher age groups the differences start widening. Among 15
year olds the average difference between the poorest and richest 20% is 1.4, but the gap
becomes 2.7 and 3.8 for children aged 18 and 21, respectively. So, it seems that education
differences between the tails of the distribution start becoming apparent at around age 15
(note also that in general, the differences are smaller for countries with higher GDP per
capita).25
There is extensive literature on the determinants of schooling,
23 and there seems to be
consensus in that family background plays a key role in the process of human capital
accumulation. Table 4 documents the association between some indicators of family
background, and schooling attainment in the 18 LAC countries considered so far. We
present the coefficients from a regression performed on 15 year olds, where the
dependent variable is the average years of schooling, and the independent variables are
the years of schooling of the mother and father, respectively, and household income per
capita (excluding the income of the person in question in case he/she is an income
earner). The table also includes a column with the R
2 from the regression. This statistic
has an average of 16%, but reaches 26% for Brazil, indicating that the association
between a child’s attainment and family background can be very important. As is
common in this type of regressions, the coefficient for mother’s schooling is most of the
times higher than the fathers’. The table includes results for more than 1 year whenever
possible, but there seems to be no clear pattern of change during the 1990s.
There are several possible interpretations for the result that parental background has an
effect on the schooling of children. One possibility is that more educated parents put
more input into their children’s education, which facilitates their achievements of
academic targets. Alternatively it is possible that less educated parents face binding
liquidity constraints that prevent them from borrowing the amounts necessary to see their
children through a certain number of years of schooling and therefore enjoying the high
returns to education.
While it is difficult to distinguish between these alternative hypotheses without a
structural model of education choices and additional evidence that would control for
selection biases, there is evidence in some household surveys favoring the latter
explanation.
  24  Specifically, surveys for Bolivia, Costa  Rica, Chile, El Salvador,
Paraguay, and Venezuela include a question in the surveys asking children and young
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some evidence against the hypothesis of binding liquidity constraints in the US. The reality of Latin26
adults not enrolled in school why they are not attending. The answers to these questions
could constitute a first step towards discriminating among the competing explanations
mentioned in the previous paragraph. To summarize this information, we classify the
possible reasons for not attending into eight groups: (i) the individual is currently
working, (ii) lack of financial resources, (iii) maternity or household work, (iv) not
interested in attending school, (v) no infrastructure, materials, teachers, or school
available, (vi) finished school, (vii) too old to attend, and (viii) other. Table 5 presents the
results by restricting the sample to young adults with 21 years of age, separating
individuals belonging to the richest and poorest 10% of the population.
25
There are interesting differences between rich and poor. For instance, according to these
results, around 25% of the 21 year olds from the first decile that are not enrolled in school
respond that they do not attend because they lack the necessary financial resources, while
17.8% do not attend because they are working. Around 15% say they are not interested
(which could be due to the low quality of the education to which they have access), while
12.7% respond that they do not attend because of their age (which normally reflects high
repetition rates). Less than 9% respond that the reason is lack of infrastructure, teachers,
materials, etc. In the case of the 21 year olds belonging to the richest quintile the main
reasons are work (34.6%), lack of interest (17.1%), maternity or household work (9.2%),
infrastructure (7.2%), and only 9% respond that the reason is that they lack financial
resources.
Apart from the fact that the answers vary, it should be noted that an apparently similar
response to the same question does not necessarily mean that the reasons for not
attending are identical. For instance, in the case of work, the response by the poor might
be associated mostly to financial constraints faced by the family, which cannot afford
having a young adult in school instead of generating income in the labor market.
However, in the case of a person of the same age but at the top of the income distribution,
the situation might be totally different. As illustrated in Figure 5, typically a 21 year-old
                                                                                                                                                                    
America is likely to be very different. Cameron and Heckman also discuss the importance of dynamic
selection biases.
25 Similar results are obtained for 12, 15, and 18 year olds.27
in the richest 20% has almost 4 more years more of schooling than the one at the bottom
20%. Therefore, in the case of the rich, lack of enrollment due to work is more likely to
reflect the attractiveness of the opportunities in the labor market for relatively  well-
educated young adults.
One interesting conclusion from these responses is that a rather low proportion of the
population seems to be constrained by the supply of public education. In fact, the only
country for which more than 10% of the sample declares that they are not enrolled in
school due to infrastructure limitations is Costa Rica, which is one of the LAC countries
with the best public education services.  For the poor, clearly the lack of means to finance
the investment is the key restriction for not continuing to accumulate human capital.
A naive interpretation of these results could be that to provide incentives for the
accumulation of human capital among the poor one should offer income transfers to
eliminate the income constraint. However, recalling the results in Table 4, the problem
seems to be more complex. Individuals born in families with low human capital are to
some extent predetermined to acquire less education than those born in better conditions.
The importance of family background is an indication that the problems are much deeper.
Such variables could indicate that we do not live in a world with perfect credit markets
and complete insurance mechanisms where individuals can invest with long-term,
depending on their preferences. They could also indicate that poor children do not receive
as much educational inputs from their family. In the first case, a possible policy
implication would be the relaxation of credit constraints, while in the second case, one
could think of programs that target very young poor children to substitute for the missing
inputs from their families.  The reason the “income constraint” is binding for the poor is
because there are other constraints to the accumulation of human capital. Loosening the
income constraint at least temporarily may facilitate schooling progress, but the family
background effect and the forces behind it will continue to inhibit the accumulation of
this income-earning asset. The estimation of a structural model of human capital
acquisition might be required to consider all these connections adequately.28
4.  Results from Country Studies
As mentioned in  the introduction, the main objective of the studies in this Research
Network project is to document the link between assets and poverty, and where possible,
to identify the restrictions that the poor face for accumulating income-earning assets. In
the previous section we illustrated some of the connections that can be made both
theoretically and empirically, but the topic calls for a more detailed study. We now
summarize the main findings of the six country studies carried out with this purpose.
The countries included are Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru. All
studies rely heavily on household survey data, and in many cases they combine several
other sources. For instance, in Brazil, Marcelo Neri and his collaborators combine the
annual household survey with monthly employment data and  a survey on consumer
finances. In Bolivia, Gray-Molina, Jimenez, Perez de Rada, and Yañez, while also using
existing household surveys, ran a small survey to collect information on social capital
specifically for this project. The work by  Larrañaga and  Contreras for Chile uses
household surveys and adds information on the quality of education services through the
National System of tests scores.
 For Colombia, Leivobich and Núñez combine several
household surveys. In their work for Costa Rica, Trejos and Montiel rely on available
household surveys, but they perform a survey on micro enterprises specifically for this
project, while  Escobal, Saavedra, and Torero mainly rely on the available household
surveys for Peru for their study.
All country studies follow a common  structure. They first examine the evolution of
poverty for the longest possible period of time; they decompose the changes in poverty
into the effect of economic growth and income redistribution; and they present a poverty
profile for recent years. Second, each study presents an analysis of the distribution of the
income-earning assets for which information is available. While some of the studies are
able to look at various types of assets, including, in the case of Brazil and Bolivia, some
measures of ‘social capital’, the emphasis is on human capital and in particular on
schooling.  Most of the studies are also able to look into the ‘utilization’ of assets (again,
mainly human capital) and some of them carry out a detailed examination of this issue.29
Third, with the exception of Chile, the country  studies present either logit or  probit
estimations attempting to quantify the extent to which poverty and assets are linked.  It
should be stressed that this evidence should be interpreted as illustrating some useful
correlation patterns, rather than identifying the ‘causes’ of poverty.
Apart from following this common structure, each individual study examines a specific
aspect of the relation between poverty and assets in detail. In Brazil the emphasis is on
determining whether income-earning assets play an important role in cushioning the
consumption of poor families from unexpected shocks. This study also emphasizes the
importance of measuring physical capital assets.  The Bolivian case study is the only
paper in which the effects of social capital are the main focus of the research. The authors
designed an interesting survey carried out in the city of El Alto in an attempt to measure
social capital and its link to poverty. The Colombian paper emphasizes the measurement
of physical capital and performs some simulations to obtain an idea about the effect on
poverty of widening access to credit. The Chile study exploits high quality data on
student achievement to look into the process of accumulation of human capital. It provide
evidence not only on the quantity of human capital that the poor are able to accumulate,
but also on its quality. For Costa Rica, the authors perform an analysis of the access to
capital and credit. They make an effort to identify the restrictions that the poor face in
accumulating human and physical capital and stress the role played by the returns to
assets (which are determined largely by market forces) on the standard of living of the
poor. Finally, the paper for Peru focuses on the role of assets in a dynamic context. This
study exploits the fact that the Peruvian surveys have a (relatively long) panel
dimension.
26 Specifically, they determine whether having access to assets increases the
probability of escaping poverty.
4.1 Summary of the Evidence
To summarize the main conclusion of each case study we follow a structure similar to the
papers, rather than focusing on one paper at the time for all topics. We first present some
evidence on the evolution of poverty in the six countries, we then summarize the relation
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between poverty and assets and look at the econometric evidence on the link between
these two variables. Finally we discuss the restrictions to accumulate that some of the
papers are able to identify.
4.1.1 The Evolution of Poverty
Since we are interested in the long-term determinants of poverty, it is useful to have some
information on the historical trends followed by this variable. Table 6 summarizes the
evidence provided in each case. It should be stressed that the estimates are comparable
within each country, but the levels are neither comparable across countries, nor with the
evidence presented in Figure 1, since the methodology employed in each country, and the
characteristics of the surveys are not necessarily the same. Note also that the period
encompassed in each case varies.
In five of the six cases, the proportion of poor declined between the first and last survey
available to the authors.
27 The only case in which poverty increases, is Peru. It should be
stressed, however, that the sample period includes, in the case of Peru, the dramatic crisis
of  the beginning of the 1990s during which private aggregate consumption declined by
around 25% in real terms. In Brazil, Neri, et.al. present estimates with a moderate and an
extreme poverty line, and interestingly, while moderate poverty declines extreme poverty
increases between 1985 and 1995.
Table 6 also presents the result from a decomposition of the change in poverty into three
components: a growth effect, a redistribution component, and a residual.
28 In the case of
Brazil (for extreme poverty), Bolivia, Colombia, and Costa Rica, the changes in poverty
registered in each period were due exclusively to growth. Income distribution
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evidence in Table 6.
28 To perform the decomposition the authors use the methodology by Datt and Ravallion (1992). The
decomposition simulates the change in poverty that would have been observed had average income
changed as it actually did, but the distribution had remained constant (the growth effect). The redistribution
component is obtained by simulating the change in poverty that would have occurred, had average income
remained constant, but the distribution shifted as it actually did.31
deteriorated in these cases, and if this had been the only shift taking place, poverty would
have actually increased. In the case of Chile, inequality had a slight poverty-reducing
effect, but still most of the poverty reduction is attributable to growth. Peru is the only
country where an improvement in income distribution played an important role in poverty
reduction, but even here the growth effect was larger and of the opposite sign. Thus,
wherever there has been poverty reduction, the decline has been mainly associated to
growth and not to improvements in the distribution of income.
4.1.2 Assets: Distribution, Use, and Returns
Table 7 summarizes the range of topics covered by each study. As can be observed, all
six papers look at the distribution of years of schooling. The data presented is in line with
the evidence in Section 3 of this paper, and confirms that the distribution of human
capital has a strong connection with the distribution of income and poverty. In Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru, there is an attempt to measure some aspects of physical
capital and its distribution. While there are differences in the detail each study is able to
achieve, they all confirm that physical capital assets in the economy are very highly
concentrated among a small group of the population.
In Bolivia, Colombia and Costa Rica, information on the access to credit is also available.
As would be expected, the evidence shows a very unequal distribution of access to credit.
For Colombia, a static simulation (which admittedly neglects the issue of reverse
causation) suggests that if the poor had the same access to credit as the non-poor, poverty
might be reduced considerably. With regards to social capital, Brazil and Bolivia are the
only countries where information allowed for some measurement of magnitude and
distribution.
In terms of the use of income-earning assets, the papers for Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and
Costa Rica perform detailed analyses of the determinants of labor force participation (the
rate of use of human capital). They show very strong differences between the poor and
rich in female participation to the labor force. When the incentives to use the available
human capital in market related activities are high enough, females participate more.32
However, when the pattern of return to skill is characterized by very low wages for the
unskilled, we observe very low rates of female participation.
In the study for Costa Rica, Trejos and Montiel are able to examine the use of physical
capital. Their conclusion is that the accumulation of assets is not necessarily a
requirement for increasing income-earning capacity. Having access to some kinds of
capital through credit markets for instance is an equally powerful advantage as owning
the asset itself. The policy implication is that poverty alleviation measures aimed at
providing more access and not only ownership to investment and capital goods could
have considerable potential for poverty reduction. The country study for Bolivia presents
evidence on the use of social capital. The authors document the access to several types of
social capital assets and show which are less likely to be associated with poverty.
Four of the country studies provide evidence on the differential returns of either human or
physical capital, and in three countries there is evidence that the combination of different
types of assets can yield greater incomes than their independent use. In the case of
Bolivia, evidence on the crossed returns to social and human capital is presented. In
Costa Rica and Peru, the authors show that human and physical capital, when combined,
may yield greater returns than when used separately. In the studies for Chile and Costa
Rica, there is a detailed analysis of the returns to human capital. The authors of these
studies confirm that the returns to education are non-linear. The poor not only have
smaller stocks of human capital, but the scarce assets they have are the least rewarded by
the labor market. The study for Costa Rica provides evidence on the differences in the
returns that the poor and rich receive for similar assets, with emphasis of several kinds of
physical capital.
4.1.3. Some Connections between Poverty and Assets
To look at the relation between poverty and assets 5 out of the 6 country studies estimate
probit or logit regressions for the probability of being below the poverty line, as a
function of the ownership or access to human capital, physical capital and social capital.
This kind of analysis is illustrative about the associations between poverty and assets, but33
since the variables are clearly endogenous the results can only be taken as evidence about
the correlation between the variables without causality implied. Poor people have, almost
by definition, few assets, so there will be a strong connection between ownership/access
to assets and poverty.
Even so, the results from the probit and logit estimations are illustrative. A summary of
the main findings is presented in Table 8. To indicate that the study found a significant
negative relation between poverty and one of the assets, we include a (-) sign in the
relevant cell. A ‘0’ is included when the relation was estimated but the resulting
coefficient was not statistically significant.
According to the Table, in all cases where the estimation was performed, a strong inverse
relation between years of schooling and the probability of being poor was found. In Costa
Rica and Peru there is also evidence that having more labor market experience is
associated with a negative probability of falling below the poverty line. Wherever
information was available, the correlation between physical capital assets and poverty
was also estimated. With the only exceptions being owning a business in Bolivia and
owning a house in Peru, the rest of the associations have the expected negative significant
coefficient, indicating that greater access to physical capital is associated with lower
probability of being poor.
In Brazil, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Peru some information on access to social capital is
available. All estimations report that the relation between social capital and poverty is
inverse. As mentioned above, the country study for Bolivia looks into these connections
in more detail. In their estimations, Gray-Molina, et.al. find that some forms of social
capital have much stronger correlation than others.
4.1.4 Restrictions to Accumulate
In the case of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica, the authors were able to identify
some of the restrictions that the poor face for accumulating income-earning assets. Table34
9 indicates which types of restrictions they were able to document.
29 In all four cases,
evidence of an income constraint for acquiring human capital, was obtained.
Additionally, for Brazil Neri, et.al. argue that since the poor have few assets, they are not
able to insure against income risk. Therefore, they need to build up buffer stocks to face
unexpected income fluctuations, but since they are continuously exposed to shocks they
are only able to have high frequency saving, but not the long term accumulation that is
necessary to build up an asset stock. Being subject to high uncertainty in the absence of
adequate insurance mechanisms becomes a restriction to acquiring more assets.
In Colombia and Costa Rica, the authors were able to identify the role of capital market
restrictions on poverty by examining the role of access to credit. For micro enterprises in
Costa Rica and for the poor in general in Colombia, access to credit was identified as a
major constraint for escaping poverty and for having access to productive assets to
increase incomes.
One of the most interesting cases is that of Peru, where the authors are able to exploit the
panel structure of their data to perform a dynamic analysis. In particular, they estimate a
model of transitions in and out of poverty conditional on several variables, including the
number of assets. Their analysis could be profitably extended in the future to consider the
relationship between the ownership of different assets  in the initial period  and the
probability of leaving poverty.
4.2 What Do We Learn from Each Study?
From the study for Brazil, we mainly learn two things. The first is that one of the most
important roles of assets is that they are strong determinants of the capacity to absorb
unexpected shocks to income. The second, which also has to do with this, is that in a
context of high uncertainty, assets will continuously be used as buffer stock, so the
capacity to build up stocks will be limited by the instability in the environment. Even if
uncertainty induces precautionary savings, and therefore it incentives accumulation, it
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still leads to the depletion rather than accumulation of assets. The reason is that
uncertainty induces investment in relatively unproductive (but liquid) assets, such as cash
holdings instead of human capital. Insurance mechanisms or a stable environment will
therefore act in favor of a more equitable distribution of assets.
The main conclusion from the Bolivia study is that social capital also matters for the
capacity to escape poverty. Furthermore, when combined with human capital, it may
yield greater returns in terms of income. However, as the authors themselves point out,
social capital is the most difficult asset to quantify. This study has taken some first steps
for determining its importance in terms of poverty, but there is still scope for obtaining
more evidence on its value and distribution.
Perhaps the main conclusion from the study for Chile by Larrañaga and Contreras is that
not only the size of the stock matters, its quality can be even more important. In the
specific case of human capital, the authors show that even though in Chile the difference
between the average schooling of children at the top and bottom of the distribution is
apparently not that large at young ages, education can be of totally different value
because of its quality. Children from poorer families tend to access schools with the
lowest scores in terms of student achievement, while the rich mostly attend the best
scoring schools. This shows that the effects of family background on attainment may feed
through various mechanisms, and that to be able to accumulate more human capital,
restrictions other than income must be overcome.
The Colombian case study by Leivobich and Nuñez supports the view that providing
access to credit and improving financial markets could have large potential on poverty
reduction. Improving the distribution of human capital could certainly have a positive
effect on poverty, but the effect would be much larger if combined with loosening up
liquidity constraints.
One of the main lessons from the study for Costa Rica, is that while the distribution of
assets and their use are important, the returns to the assets, which is not fully under the36
control of households or policy, may be an even more important determinant of poverty.
Simulations of the effect on poverty of increasing the rate of use of human capital to non-
poor levels reveals that differences in labor market participation account for some of the
differences between individuals below and above the poverty line. However, assuming
that the poor receive the returns that the rich obtain for the same asset would dramatically
reduce poverty. Therefore, while policies aimed at temporarily increasing the incomes of
the poor through transfers could be adequate, if the price structure is permanently acting
against the poor, any policy action of this type will be “swimming against the tide.”
Changing the price structure may not be a realistic policy objective, but if these forces are
identified and quantified, it is likely that the policy approach would be different.
Additionally, the authors show that enhancing the accumulation of income-earning assets
is not the only way of having a long-term effect on poverty. Providing access to assets
through the market may be as effective and perhaps is a more attainable policy goal, at
least in the case of some physical capital assets.
Finally, from the case of Peru we confirm that the productivity of assets may be
significantly enhanced if more than one type of asset is owned. Specifically, the authors
show that owning physical capital in the form of land has much higher returns when the
asset is combined with human capital. Additionally,  Escobal,  Saavedra, and Torero
confirm that assets play a crucial role in the probability of exiting poverty. A much better
distribution of assets is associated with higher social mobility and better prospects for
wider sectors of the population.
5.  Conclusions
In this chapter we have outlined a different approach to the analysis of poverty in Latin
America. Such an approach, rather than focussing only on household income and its
distribution, is based on the analysis of the ownership of, access to, and use of income
generating assets and their accumulation. The basic idea we use is the recognition that
household income is given by the return on the various assets owned and used in a
productive fashion by the household members. These include human capital as well as37
physical and financial assets and the access to what has been labeled as ‘social capital.’
The focus on assets and their accumulation makes the analysis we propose intrinsically
dynamic.
The six studies contained in this book constitute a first step towards the implementation
of our proposed approach. It should be stressed that the analysis presented here is far
from being complete. Two important limitations need to be mentioned, if nothing else to
define the agenda for future research. First, even though the 6 studies in this volume use a
variety of data sources, data availability, especially in measuring the stock of different
kinds of assets available to households, still constitutes an important limitation in Latin
America as it does in other regions. As new data sources become available, this constraint
is likely to be progressively relaxed in the future. It is important to integrate the analysis
of human capital accumulation with the availability of and access to other assets, ranging
from financial assets, insurance programs, and credit. Similar considerations apply to the
analysis of small enterprises and, in the case of rural households, to the analysis of
production choices.
Second, while this chapter and the six studies that follow stress the importance of the
obstacles that households face in the process of asset accumulation and investment, it is
clear that to understand fully the effects of incentives, constraints, and availability of
different assets and their interaction, one cannot rely only on simple descriptive analyses.
In the future, it will be necessary to develop and estimate models that recognize the
incentives and opportunities each individual household faces. These models would allow
the identification of the main determinants of the process of accumulation of different
productive assets (especially human capital), and would give policy makers an invaluable
instrument to evaluate different policy proposals.
In addition to these two points, a number of other considerations are also important for
the proper formulation of policies aimed at the reduction of poverty through the
promotion of the accumulation of income-generating assets. The general equilibrium
effects of such policies, either on asset returns or on the functioning of private38
interactions, should be considered. Moreover, the estimation of dynamic models and the
need to identify different types of dynamic effects is likely to require longitudinal data
that are often missing. There is a case to be made for the collection of high quality
surveys that include a panel component.
In addition to proposing a different approach to the analysis of poverty, this volume also
contains information on the recent trends in poverty in Latin America. Since the focus of
several of the studies (and of this introductory chapter) is on human capital, the volume
also presents the most up-to-date information on the average level and on the distribution
of schooling in the region. From the evidence presented in the volume, it is pretty clear
that the process of human capital formation, and to a certain extent of its utilization, is




0 20 40 60 80
% Poor








































































Nic Hon ElS Bol Par DR Per Ecu Bra CRi Col Uru Pan Mex Ven Arg Chl
Poorest 20% Third Quintile Richest 20%




























Nic Hon ElS Bol Par DR Per Ecu Bra CRi Col Uru Pan Mex Ven Arg Chl
Primary incomplete Primary complete Secondary complete Higher education
































Nic Hon ElS Bol Par DR Per Ecu Bra CRi Uru Pan Mex Ven Arg Chl
Primary incomplete Primary complete Secondary complete Higher education










































Nic Hon ElS Bol Par DR Per Ecu Bra CRi Col Uru Pan Mex Ven Arg Chl
12 year olds 15 year olds 18 year olds 21 year olds
Difference in Average Years of Educ.
Between Richest and Poorest Quintile42
Table 1
      Poverty Due to Between Group Inequalities
    (% of Total Poverty)
             Inequality Between
Country Sectors of Occupations Age Male-Female Education Rural/
Activity Groups Headed Hh's Level Urban
Argentina 10.4 19.9 4.0 0.0 34.4
Bolivia 4.8 21.3 0.2 0.1 35.8 13.0
Brazil 10.5 24.8 2.2 0.4 32.4 9.7
Chile 17.9 45.7 1.7 0.2 47.8 13.5
Colombia 12.9 22.9 0.9 0.0 33.3 15.7
Costa Rica 13.5 26.1 3.0 0.4 35.3 13.5
Dominican Republic 5.0 14.3 1.4 0.8 16.8 8.4
Ecuador 5.9 10.4 1.2 0.1 17.6 7.8
El Salvador 12.0 16.5 0.1 0.3 26.2 4.1
Honduras 14.7 26.8 3.0 0.0 34.5 17.0
Jamaica 7.1 2.9 15.8 7.2
Mexico 25.7 40.3 3.2 1.1 46.9 30.2
Nicaragua 1.2 0.6 0.1 15.6 3.0
Panama 5.2 14.7 0.7 0.2 21.4 7.9
Paraguay 13.9 18.4 4.0 0.3 26.3 13.0
Peru 13.3 20.6 0.2 0.9 32.4 19.6
Uruguay 6.7 19.6 2.1 0.5 18.8
Venezuela 9.1 21.4 0.6 0.3 23.5
Average 11.3 21.5 2.0 0.5 28.6 12.2
Source: Authors'calculations with household survey data. The methodology to
estimate poverty and the poverty line are the same as in Figure 1.43
Table 2
Returns to Education in Latin America During the 1990s
Country Year                             Coefficients from OLS Regression
Primary Primary Secondary Secondary Higher
Incomplete Complete Incomplete Complete Education
Argentina* 1996 0.12 0.21 0.34 0.60 1.03
Bolivia* 1990 -0.14 -0.06 0.11 0.21 0.49
Bolivia* 1991 -0.14 -0.06 0.11 0.21 0.49
Bolivia* 1993 0.09 0.17 0.36 0.66 1.11
Bolivia* 1995 0.06 0.16 0.25 0.56 1.13
Brazil 1992 0.12 0.26 0.47 0.84 1.54
Brazil 1993 0.10 0.24 0.47 0.82 1.50
Brazil 1995 0.45 0.82 1.17 1.72 2.50
Brazil 1996 0.41 0.76 1.13 1.65 2.39
Chile 1990 0.19 0.36 0.66 0.97 1.72
Chile 1992 0.20 0.33 0.61 1.02 1.83
Chile 1994 0.27 0.44 0.67 1.11 1.87
Chile 1996 0.19 0.38 0.67 1.08 1.92
Colombia 1997 0.19 0.55 0.82 1.28 2.10
Costa Rica 1989 0.22 0.42 0.70 1.04 1.51
Costa Rica 1991 0.11 0.27 0.53 0.84 1.47
Costa Rica 1993 0.30 0.43 0.65 0.88 1.55
Costa Rica 1995 0.21 0.37 0.57 0.84 1.44
Dominican Republic 1996 0.30 0.49 0.63 0.75 1.39
Ecuador 1995 0.23 0.49 0.90 1.26 1.64
Honduras 1992 0.15 0.38 0.71 1.11 1.82
Honduras 1996 0.24 0.54 0.70 1.23 1.90
Honduras 1998 0.17 0.40 0.59 1.79 1.92
Mexico 1989 0.33 0.68 1.05 1.47 1.90
Mexico 1992 0.43 0.82 1.27 1.72 2.37
Mexico 1994 0.24 0.52 0.88 1.39 2.05
Mexico 1996 0.09 0.40 0.93 1.65 2.43
Nicaragua 1993 0.40 0.55 0.71 0.99 1.47
Panama 1991 -0.07 0.04 0.22 0.47 0.96
Panama 1995 0.06 0.14 0.33 0.56 1.09
Panama 1997 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.23 0.96
Paraguay  1995 0.32 0.71 1.07 1.63 2.26
Peru 1991 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.12 0.31
Peru 1994 0.03 0.08 0.27 0.34 0.73
Peru 1997 0.22 0.29 0.50 0.56 1.09
El Salvador 1995 0.26 0.49 0.73 1.17 1.77
Uruguay* 1989 0.03 0.12 0.27 0.32 0.52
Uruguay* 1992 0.27 0.51 0.81 0.99 1.47
Uruguay* 1995 0.18 0.36 0.73 0.93 1.46
Venezuela 1995 0.35 0.55 0.73 0.98 1.44
Venezuela 1997 0.27 0.43 0.58 0.88 1.59
Average LAC 0.18 0.37 0.61 0.95 1.52
Source: Authors´calculations from household survey data.
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                              Dependent Variable Years of Schooling
Country Year             Coefficient  Independent Variables
Mother´s Father´s Household R-Squared**
Schooling** Schooling** Per capita
Income***
Argentina* 1996 8.43 3.70 5.15 9.36
Bolivia* 1990 5.37 7.74 3.98 12.26
Bolivia* 1991 5.37 7.74 3.98 12.26
Bolivia* 1993 7.47 5.20 -0.62 11.35
Bolivia* 1995 3.99 3.76 -1.45 4.85
Brazil 1992 19.98 12.05 0.00 26.97
Brazil 1993 19.96 11.95 0.13 25.88
Brazil 1995 18.86 11.24 6.61 25.86
Brazil 1996 18.10 11.10 8.74 26.07
Chile 1990 8.23 4.08 0.01 10.37
Chile 1992 9.83 1.89 -0.02 7.40
Chile 1994 7.25 2.36 0.00 7.34
Chile 1996 7.48 2.25 0.00 9.03
Colombia 1997 22.31 5.15 0.00 24.31
Costa Rica 1989 16.27 4.17 0.04 12.00
Costa Rica 1991 16.90 7.08 -0.12 20.93
Costa Rica 1993 20.62 4.45 0.07 26.37
Costa Rica 1995 12.04 4.43 0.05 15.29
Dom. Rep. 1996 18.84 3.34 1.10 16.97
Ecuador 1995 19.81 6.49 0.00 21.12
Honduras 1992 18.48 6.01 10.80 22.79
Honduras 1996 18.33 10.25 6.75 23.99
Honduras 1998 18.97 8.14 -0.31 15.10
Mexico 1989 20.76 12.07 0.00 21.04
Mexico 1992 14.94 12.27 0.00 12.73
Mexico 1994 19.94 20.56 0.57 15.41
Mexico 1996 21.65 17.58 0.03 14.57
Nicaragua 1993 20.06 13.30 5.19 18.85
Panama 1991 14.24 4.36 2.81 17.05
Panama 1995 14.48 0.88 9.12 19.82
Panama 1997 12.42 4.88 4.01 15.21
Paraguay  1995 22.61 3.39 0.00 16.15
Peru 1991 11.23 2.01 31.04 14.92
Peru 1994 9.02 4.33 17.18 15.74
Peru 1997 6.23 8.89 20.20 21.35
El Salvador 1995 20.69 9.27 3.43 17.73
Uruguay* 1989 7.22 2.44 26.15 8.04
Uruguay* 1992 8.49 2.56 0.00 6.25
Uruguay* 1995 6.21 4.95 0.00 6.80
Venezuela 1995 17.10 4.54 0.11 18.28
Venezuela 1997 10.90 7.61 0.08 12.52
Source: Authors´calculations from household survey data.
*Surveys with Urban coverage.
**Coefficient multiplied by 100
***Coefficient multiplied by 10,00046
Table 5
Reasons for Not Attending School
(% Distribution by Category)
Average Venezuela Paraguay El Salvador Chile Costa Rica Bolivia Category
1995 1995 1995 1994 1995 1995
Reasons for not attending school all 21 year olds
26.4 38.9 15.67   27.8 32.7 17.1 42.1 Working 1
12.7 9.9 28.19   22.3 10.7 13.2 19.9 No financial resources 2
9.0 13.9 12.55   14.8 9.3 5.1 10.7 Maternity-household wk 3
12.1 20.2 10.22   13.6 5.0 22.1 11.7 Not interested 4
4.3 7.4 0.47    6.2 1.9 6.2 No infrastructure 5
0.9 1.5 11.02   0.4 1.5 Finished schooling 6
7.8 1.4 21.88   6.9 28.9 6.8 2.7 Age 7
13.4 6.7 8.1 11.6 29.6 11.2 Other 8
Reasons for not attending in first decile
17.8 20.8 9.7 18.0 21.6 9.3 27.4 Working 1
24.6 15.8 33.9 21.8 14.0 22.3 39.6 No financial resources 2
10.1 13.6 9.3 15.6 11.3 5.3 5.7 Maternity-household wk 3
14.3 30.0 12.0 14.2 4.6 16.0 9.1 Not interested 4
8.7 6.8 9.9 3.8 14.5 No infrastructure 5
0.8 0.8 0.5 1.1 Finished schooling 6
12.7 2.3 16.4 11.1 35.4 7.7 3.3 Age 7
14.3 10.0 18.7 9.0 9.3 25.0 13.7 Other 8
Reasons for not attending school in richest decile
34.6 49.1 34.8 53.3 42.6 0.0 27.6 Working 1
9.0 2.0 9.8 9.8 4.0 22.4 6.2 No financial resources 2
9.2 8.1 13.4 4.9 8.2 11.3 Maternity-household wk 3
17.1 23.2 16.7 13.2 2.3 8.1 39.2 Not interested 4
7.2 9.0 7.2 0.8 2.5 16.3 No infrastructure 5
3.7 3.0 0.9 7.2 Finished schooling 6
8.3 1.5 6.0 2.0 23.4 Age 7
18.3 4.1 24.6 7.5 20.4 45.0 8.3 Other 8
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data.47
Table 6
Table 7
Changes in Poverty and Decomposition
                              of the Change into Growth and Redistribution Effects
Country Period Poverty Initial Change % Change % Change % Change
Line Poverty (Points) due to due to due to
Rate Growth Redisrtibution Residual
Brazil (1985-95) Extreme 10.03 1.02 -0.40 1.45 -0.05
(1985-95) Moderate 30.42 -2.4 -0.40 -0.70 0.10
Bolivia (1990-95) Moderate 52.4 -5.3 -1.47 0.44 0.03
Chile (1987-96) Moderate 45.1 -21.9 -0.85 -0.07 -0.08
Colombia (1991-95) Moderate 58.5 -0.04 -1.03 0.06 -0.03
Costa Rica (1986-95) Moderate 29.4 -3.8 -1.17 0.17 -0.02
Peru (1985-96) Moderate 43.1 7.4 0.99 -0.27 0.28
Source: Calculated from country studies in this volume.
Analysis of Access, Use and Returns to Income-Earning Assets
Country                Measurement of Stocks                       Analysis of Use                       Estimation of Returns
Human Physical Social Human Physical Social Human Physical Social Crossed
Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital Returns
Brazil x x x
Bolivia x x x x x
Chile x x x
Colombia x x x
Costa Rica x x x x x x x
Peru x x x
Source: Information from country studies in this volume.48
Table 8
Table 9
Identification of Restrictions to Accumulate Assets






Costa Rica x x
Peru
Source: Taken from country studies in this volume.
Analysis of Relation Between Assets and Poverty
                                                     Effect of Each Type of Asset on the Probability of Being Poor
                                     (Sign and Significance of Coefficients from Logit and Probit Estimations)
Country
Variable Brazil Bolivia Chile Colombia Costa Rica Peru
Human Capital
Years of schooling - - - - -
Labor market Experience - -
Physical Capital
Housing ownership - 0
Access to Credit - - -
Owns bussiness 0
Other Financial Assets -
Capital for investment -
Land - -
Household appliances & durables - -
Social Capital
Membership to Unions, etc. -
Political Party Membership -
Affiliation to community - - -
Family Affiliations - -
Source: Taken from country studies in this volume.49
Appendix
Table A1
Description of Household Surveys
Country Year               Sample size Coverage Name of Survey
households individuals
Argentina 1996 3,459 11,749 Greater Buenos Aires Encuesta Permanente de Hogares
Bolivia 1996 8,311 35,648 National Encuesta Nacional de Empleo
Brazil 1995 85,270 334,263 National Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
Chile 1996 33,636 134,262 National Encuesta de Caracterizacion Socioeconomica Nacional
Colombia 1997 32,441 143,398 National Encuesta Nacional de Hogares-Fuerza de Trabajo
Costa Rica 1997 9,631 40,613 National Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiples
Dominican Republic 1996 548 24,041 National Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo
Ecuador 1995 5,810 26,941 National Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida
El Salvador 1995 8,482 40,004 National Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiples
Honduras 1998 6,494 32,696 National Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propositos Multiples
Jamaica 1996 1,823 6,997 National Jamaica Survey of Living Condition
Mexico 1996 14,042 64,916 National Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares
Nicaragua 1993 4,458 24,542 National Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medicion de Niveles de Vida
Panama 1997 9,875 40,320 National Encuesta de Hogares
Paraguay 1995 4,667 21,910 National Encuesta de Hogares
Peru 1997 3,843 19,745 National Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medicion de Niveles de Vida
Uruguay 1995 20,057 64,930 Urban Encuesta Continua de Hogares
Venezuela 1997 15,948 76,965 National Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo50
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